There have been very few wars in human history that were clearly morally justifiable; NATO’s 2001 intervention in Afghanistan was undoubtedly one of them. In the 1990s America had watched as the Taliban supported Al Qaeda and allowed it to use Afghanistan as a base from which to train, equip and support terrorist operations against American citizens. These operations included the African embassy bombings, the 1999 plots in Jordan and America, the bombing of the USS Cole and 9/11. Over the course of five years America had restricted its response to the bombardment of a few terrorist training camps. Several operations to capture or kill bin Laden were cancelled due to doubts over the legality of such actions. So in 2001, after the attacks on its own mainland, the political leadership of America had no choice but to take action; it could not continue to allow Afghanistan to be used as an operating base from which to attack the country. America and NATO had to intervene to destroy a terrorist organisation and its political backers in order to prevent further attacks on innocent civilians. Once this aim had been achieved America could not abandon the country to poverty and civil war as it had done in 1989, it had to help to build a relatively stable and democratic state.
Nothing that has happened over the last seven years has acted to change my mind about this, but having watched several programmes about British troops in Afghanistan I have started to wonder what we are achieving in Afghanistan and whether a change in tactics, if not strategy, is needed. The above video shows the type of engagements faced by British soldiers, these battles may kill a lot of Taliban but they also take their toll on British troops and alienate locals without achieving any strategic success. With British forces enduring some of the heaviest combat seen since WWII it is tempting to ask what can be done to prevent Operation Enduring Freedom from descending into Operation Enduring Stalemate.
The mistakes in Afghanistan were made from day one. President Bush showed initial unease in sacrificing US blood in a foreign country and relied on Special Forces and the Mujahideen to depose the Taliban. But while this may have been an appropriate tactic for overthrowing the Taliban; Bush, under the influence of the woeful Rumsfeld, failed to deploy enough combat troops to destroy the Al Qaeda leadership. In December 2001 as bin Laden and his fighters were trapped in Tora Bora under a terrible aerial bombardment, CIA agent Gary Berntsen could hear the Al Qaeda leader apologising to his followers on the radio for bringing such destruction upon them. Special Forces were perhaps 20 minutes away from capturing bin Laden when he was able to bribe a Northern Alliance leader and escape over the border to Pakistan. Berntsen has testified that with adequate forces the US could have captured bin Laden at Tora Bora in 2001. Western efforts never fully recovered from that early missed opportunity and a lack of manpower and resources allowed Mullah Omar and Ayman al Zawahirri to escape and hampered the prosecution of Operation Anaconda which aimed to destroy the remnants of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
By 2002, of course, Bush had his sights firmly set on Iraq. A democratic Government was elected in Afghanistan and re-development (or more accurately ‘development’) programmes began for the first time in 30 years. But alas the years 2002-2006 represented a great opportunity lost. The enormous resources poured into Iraq could have been spent in Afghanistan while the country enjoyed some small measure of security and stability. The NATO mission in the south of Afghanistan could have been implemented in 2002 instead of 2006, meaning that Nato forces would likely have had a four year cushion of relative peace in which to implement their reconstruction projects. Instead by the time the West turned its attention from Iraq back to Afghanistan the Taliban had had time to re-group and re-arm and Afghanistan was still light years from being able to guarantee its own security.
Life has improved for most Afghans since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Since then there has been a 25% decline in infant mortality, the number of rural health clinics has tripled, mass-vaccination schemes have been established, 5 million refugees have returned to the country, the economy has grown markedly, 4.2 million children (including 1.9 million girls) have been enrolled in primary schools, a democratic Government has been established and about $15 billion of international aid has been invested in the country. On the downside the country is still one of the worst performing states in virtually all measures. Afghanistan is still dirt poor with at least 40% unemployment, 49% of men and 86% of women are wholly illiterate, the economy is dominated by narcotics, the Government is one of the most corrupt in the world, the police and army barely function, infrastructure is outdated or non existent and parasitic diseases and malnutrition are endemic. Most damagingly of all the Taliban has returned with a vengeance, placing a severe strain on the Nato alliance and asserting de-facto control in many parts of the south
As the situation in Iraq has slowly improved, security in Afghanistan has steadily spiralled out of control. The Taliban has mounted a fierce insurgency campaign aimed at bleeding coalition forces dry. This has included sophisticated IED attacks learnt in Iraq as well as large scale ambushes, on one occasion the Taliban were able to overrun a US base and execute the soldiers they captured inside. Just last week the Taliban tried to overrun the British base in Lashkar Ghar but coalition airpower decimated the group before they could start the attack and at least 100 Taliban fighters were believed to have died. Indeed the Taliban are often given a hiding in large scale confrontations but body counts invariably count for nothing in an insurgency campaign. There is an almost unlimited supply of recruits to the Taliban cause in the Madrassas of the Pakistani tribal belt to replace those already martyred and in any case the sheer intensity of the fighting means that the British are in danger of alienating the very Afghan civilians they are there to help.
In 2006 John Reid infamously declared that he hoped that the British Army would be able to leave Helmand without having fired a shot; yet just one battalion of the Royal Anglians fired over one million rounds of ammunition and lost 9 dead and 135 wounded in its recent 6 month tour. Reid has been misquoted in the press, his point was that Britain was in Afghanistan to rebuild the country, not to fight a war; yet the question remains, if our troops are spending all their time locked in brutal combat with the Taliban how are they supposed to achieve their objective of rebuilding the country?
For the coalition in Afghanistan the cavalry has arrived in the form of General David Petraeus. The feted general has recently taken up his post as commander of CENTCOM with overall responsibility for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Petraeus has wasted no time in setting up an Afghan brains trust in order to review US strategy. Briefing reporters the general stated "The effort in Afghanistan is going to be the longest campaign of the long war. The biggest lesson of counterinsurgency is that every situation is unique. You have to be very careful to have that nuanced understanding . . . of the circumstances on the ground," What is clear is that Petraeus will call for an Iraq style ‘surge’ to target the leadership of the Taliban and indeed both McCain and Obama have committed extra troops to Afghanistan should they be elected. However Petraeus will be well aware that no insurgent group has been defeated by military means alone, and the Taliban are no exception to this trend. Indeed it appears that one major thrust of Petraeus’ new strategy may be an attempt to reconcile more moderate members of the Taliban to the cause of the Afghan Government. "In Afghanistan, or in any country where society is dominated by tribes, reconciliation really needs to be a focus," Petraeus said, "I do think you have to talk to enemies. Clearly you want to try to reconcile with as many as possible. . . . The key there is making sure all of that is done in complete coordination and with the complete support of the Afghan government and President [Hamid] Karzai."
Now I happen to believe that talking to the Taliban is desirable, indeed the British have already done it to some effect in Helmand. In essence the problem is that the warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq is caused by a difference in perceptions between East and West. In Iraq nationalists fought US forces because they initially thought that the US was acting as imperialist power. In 2007, however, they began to realise that the US was actually trying to setup a free democratic state and transferred their loyalty to US forces with beneficial effects for Iraq. I have seen interviews with captured Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and several things struck me. Firstly they are generally products of the Pakistani Madrassa systemn, they are also usually extremely young, extremely unworldly and effectively brainwashed by a Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. They want to die as martyrs by killing coalition troops simply because they are infidels or non-believers. Geo-politics does not come into their rationale, they simply want to kill foreign troops because they are non-Muslims in a Muslim land. What these young Taliban are simply incapable of comprehending is that these foreign troops are actually in Afghanistan to rebuild the country and that religion is not something that plays a significant role in their worldview. Essentially we are seeing two worlds collide with the insane result that the situation in Afghanistan amounts to the Taliban trying to kill coalition troops and coalition troops trying to kill the Taliban. Effectively we are at stalemate, both intellectually and militarily.
The question is can moderate elements of the Taliban be persuaded to work with the national Government and coalition forces as happened with Sunni nationalists in Iraq? There are certainly elements within the Taliban that will not be turned; for we should not forget that the Taliban murders teachers and students, prominent females, Government workers, foreign aid workers and those that do not follow their particular interpretation of Islam. However there are certainly members of the Taliban who could be persuaded to accept a foreign presence in a Muslim country and give up their violent struggle. Indeed the Taliban recently held talks with Saudi Royals, claiming that they had split from Al Qaeda and they wished to discuss reconciliation in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether these claims can be taken at face value, but certainly the represent an encouraging step. The Pakistani Taliban were also reported to have requested unconditional talks with the Pakistani Government and it is possible the pressure of military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan is taking its toll on the group. Certainly the coalition and its allies must attempt to capitalise on this development. The Taliban are currently banned from politics in Afghanistan, however if some members are persuaded to drop their violent views than there may be little to differentiate them from legitimate, if repulsive, organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. I would not see this as a betrayal of the war’s aims rather it is simply one of the features of democracy that repulsive parties can come to power. However the majority of Afghans and their Government hate the Taliban and may never allow the Taliban to return to politics, President Karzai is reluctant to even talk to members of the Taliban. It is also unclear what Pakistan’s role would be in shaping Afghanistan's future. The ISI, Pakistan’s fearsome secret intelligence organisation, is known to have extensive links with the Taliban. British troops have discovered the bodies of ISI officers in Taliban compounds and the ISI is widely believed to have been behind the recent bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. Western political leaders will need to encourage Pakistan to increase the pressure on the Taliban and make sure that it is fully committed to rebuilding the country. This is, of course, easier said than done.
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, it may always be so, yet I believe the coalition can achieve its aim of establishing a democratic and reasonable secure Afghan state. To my mind there are five crucial steps that need to be taken to achieve this. Firstly more international troops are needed in Afghanistan and military pressure must be increased on the leadership of the Taliban, this may include cross-border raids on targets inside Pakistani territory. Secondly the West must talk to moderate elements within the Taliban and pursuade them to lay down their arms and commit to reconciliation. Thirdly the coalition must ensure that reconstruction efforts are increased; they must also show much more initiative and resourcefulness in order to improve the lives of ordinary Afghans. Fourthly the Taliban must be cut off from the lucrative narcotics industry, it is possible that this could be done by buying opium from direct Afghan farmers at above market rates after which it could be destroyed or even used in the pharmecutical industry. This may well eleminate a large proportion of the Taliban's funding. Fifthly, and perhaps most difficult of all, the West must deal with Pakistan. The Pakistani Army has launched several offensives against the Taliban but at the same time the Pakistani state has supported, armed and even led the Taliban in Afghanistan. The West must remove the kid gloves when it deals with Pakistan and ensure that it ends its support for Taliban militants. If it does not then Pakistan, like Afghanistan, may succumb to a brutal low-level civil war; the Taliban, after all, commits atrocities in Pakistan as well. Whether the West breaks the deadlock remains to be seen. One thing that is clear is that the status quo cannot continue indefinitely, it is costing too much blood on all sides.
