PH2009100205309

“We don’t have enough forces to do everything, everywhere, at once”

Gen. McChrystal

President Obama inherited an unenviable set of challenges from President Bush; economic crisis, nuclear proliferation in Iran, war in Iraq, unreformed healthcare and the failure to obtain international agreement on climate change. But while the world economy begins to come out of intensive care, Iraq starts to show some tentative signs of stabilisation and there is a growing consensus for action on the Iranian nuclear programme, Obama may yet see his presidency defined by the outcome of a war which is entering its ninth year.

The war in Afghanistan has been chronically under-resourced since its inception; worse, no clear strategy has ever been outlined by the politicians who have deployed troops to the country. At best coalition forces in Afghanistan can claim to have fought the Taliban to a stalemate, but in many areas of the country they appear to be loosing. After over three years in Helmand British troops often still cannot go 100 yards out of their bases without encountering deadly minefields, eight US soldiers were killed when their base was almost overrun on Saturday, some British frontline units are reported to have suffered 25% casualty rates in their recent six-month summer tour and most tellingly of all, 2009 has been bloodier for coalition forces than the first four years of the war combined. Afghanistan, the war that Obama described as “necessary”, is increasingly unpopular amongst US voters, while at the same time General McChrystal, the top soldier in the country, has warned that, without reinforcements by early next year, the conflict will “likely end in failure”.

The choices facing Obama are stark. Does he agree to McChrystal’s urgent request for 40,000 more troops and risk becoming further mired in a potentially unwinnable conflict that has already lasted as long as Vietnam and may become known as ‘Obama’s War’? Or does he, as Vice-President Biden has proposed, pull back from Afghanistan and concentrate his forces on hunting al Qaeda in Pakistan, in doing so perhaps sacrificing the meagre gains that have cost so much blood and treasure? No doubt this is one of the most difficult decisions Obama will have to take, whatever choice he makes will affect the lives of countless individuals and the futures of at least three countries. But this is the nature of the job that he volunteered to do and, bleak though the situation may seem, McChrystal’s report does offer America the chance to meet its strategic objectives whilst enabling it, one day, to extricate itself from its Central Asian tarpit.

The first question that Obama will be likely to ask himself when considering McChrystal’s request is the one that most of us ask; simply, is it worth the human cost? But while this is a natural question for any compassionate human being to ask, Obama should not allow it to cloud his judgment. In contrast to the Vietnam War, America and its allies are fielding professional volunteer armies; morale amongst ordinary troops appears to remain strong and they are often eager to do job they signed up for, even if they are privately disillusioned with the chances of success.

In essence no-one, perhaps apart from the troops themselves and their families, can really decide whether the war is ‘worth’ the cost. The more pertinent issue is whether the war is necessary and what the coalition’s strategic aims should be.

Since 2001 the major rationale for maintaining a coalition presence in Afghanistan has been the aim of creating a free democratic society, loosely based on the ideas of universal human rights. Yet Iraq has exposed the limits of American power, especially with regard to nation-building, and that was a country with a large bureaucracy and a well educated middle class. In contrast Afghanistan has been at war for thirty years, during which time its population has more than doubled and its economy has collapsed. It is reported to have no more than 200 literate and competent bureaucrats and its Government is amongst the most corrupt in the world.

It is true that much good work has been done in improving the lives of women and promoting a more free society; but most Afghans, particularly in the rural areas, are culturally closer to the Taliban than they are to the ideals of the West, (this is a country in which 80% of women are illiterate and a journalist is serving a life sentence for distributing an article about women’s rights under Islam). Even if Obama agrees to McChrystal’s request for 40,000 extra troops, that would still mean there were only 140,000 soldiers tasked with rebuilding a country of 28 million. In short the coalition only has enough manpower to concentrate in certain areas, indeed coalition troops are still to set foot in the vast southern half of Helmand Province. Women will continue to be treated as chattel in these untouched, isolated areas and rural communities will continue to live in medieval poverty; unfortunately it may always be so. The coalition succeeding in removing the brutal Taliban regime but it does not have the capability to transform Afghan culture in the short-term, even if it chose to do so.

Instead Obama must base his Afghan strategy on two pragmatic and hard-headed conditions, America’s national interests and its ability to achieve its goals. A full withdrawal from Afghanistan is clearly unfeasible; it would inevitably lead to civil war and the fall of the Karzai Government. An Afghan-Taliban regime would then be free to step up its already fierce insurgency campaign in Pakistan, a dangerously unstable nuclear-armed state. Furthermore veteran Taliban and Islamist fighters would be free, indeed would be enticed, to spread their Jihad to India, China, the ‘Stans’, the Caucasus, South East Asia, the Middle East and the West.

America then cannot cut and run, but the only objective which is seemingly achievable in the medium term is that of an Afghan Government that is relatively free and relatively incorrupt and a security situation which is stable enough for Afghan forces to take over the fight with minimal reliance upon coalition forces.

If Obama settles upon such an objective, then McChrystal has outlined the strategy and the tactics which could make it achievable; but it will require a multi-pronged approach over a long period, it will be time consuming, it will be expensive, it will be bloody and above all, it will be ugly.

Firstly the isolated rural areas should be left to the Taliban; the coalition does not have enough resources to be everywhere at once. McChrystal has already advised that he wishes to concentrate his forces in the towns and the centres of power where they can provide security for the people. America should take the lead in ensuring development projects that really improve the lives of locals are implemented quickly and efficiently, bypassing corrupt local officials. This would help to improve security, stability and Governance in populated areas and restrict Taliban influence.

If Obama authorises a further 40,000 troops it could give the coalition greater flexibility to raid Taliban opeerating bases and keep its influence from the population centres. McChrystal has also declared the coalition forces should be more concerned with protecting local civilians rather than killing Taliban. Use of firepower and air strikes should be scaled back in heavily settled areas and priority could be given to providing security rather than engaging in pitched battles.

McChrystal believes that there should be increased efforts to turn less ideologically committed members of the Taliban and reintegrate them into society. Turning former insurgents was key to the success of the surge in Iraq, and full financial and diplomatic resources should be made available for this project. Obama should even countenance the participation of the Taliban in democratic Governance.

However this campaign will not be won simply by killing, isolating or turning the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban will probably be active in the region for decades to come, much like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or FARC in Columbia. Crucially the coalition will rely on Afghans to form a (relatively) coherent state and take responsibility for their own security, thus allowing coalition forces the chance to withdraw with their strategic objectives intact.

This 'Afgan element' is likely to be the lynchpin of Obama’s Afghan strategy and unfortunately it represents by far the biggest challenge. The brazen corruption which was so evident during the recent re-election of President Karzai is likely to have hugely damaged the reputation of democratic Government in the eyes of ordinary Afghans. It is unrealistic to expect the country to achieve a Jefforsonian democracy in eight years; however, some form of functioning central Government is crucial if Afghanistan is not to fall back into civil war or theocratic dictatorship. Obama could put pressure on Karzai to agree to a second round of voting, but corruption seems endemic, and at this stage it is difficult to see how far America can interfere in the running of what is still a sovereign state.

It is impossible, indeed it is not desirable, to kill every last Talib. Any coalition exit strategy will depend on the readiness of Afghan forces to take over responsibility for their country’s security. McChrystal wants to expand the Afghan Army to 134,000 by December 2010 and achieve an eventual Afghan police and army strength of 400,000. If Obama and Nato provide extra resources it is feasible that this could be achieved, but it is not just a question of numbers. Afghanistan is poverty stricken and it would probably need international funding to permanently maintain an army of this size. Furthermore the current Afghan Army is plagued by ill-discipline, drug use, corruption, paedophilia, and incompetence. It remains to be seen whether the Afghan state could maintain an army which could hold off the Taliban by itself. History suggests it is possible; after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988 the Afghan National Army was able to hold back the Mujahideen until the Central Government, (shorn of Western and Soviet financial support) finally collapsed in 1992.

As flag draped coffins continue to be flown home few of us would want the awesome responsibility faced by Obama as he decides whether to send more men and women to be killed or maimed thousands of miles away from home. If there was any doubt about the gravity of the decision it was dispelled by the matter-of-fact warning contained in McChrystal’s report that if the surge is authorised it is likely that in the short-term "Afghan and coalition casualties will increase."

But we should also heed McChrystal’s warning that “Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure." If Obama authorises the surge and McChrystal’s strategy is successful we are still likely to be left with a Government tainted by corruption, a country mired in poverty, human rights for women and others as far away as ever and a stubborn and bloody rural insurgency. Few in 2001 would have seen this outcome as a victory, but given the challenges faced today, simply avoiding defeat may represent an unlikely success.